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I. Introduction  and Summary
As in many  developing  countries,  China's  population  is aging  rapidly,  due
to fertility  policies  that  have  depressed  the number  of children  combined  with
rapid medical  improvements  that  have  prolonged  life  for the old  (Table 1).  By
2030 over  one quarter  of the world's  old people  will  live  in China.  While  those
over  60 accounted  for 9% of China's  population  in 1990, they will be 22% in 2030
and 26%  in 2050.  It will  take  China only  three decades  to reach  the  1990  OECD
level  of  18%,  while  in most  OECD  countries  it  took  nearly  a  century  for  the
proportion  over  60 to double  from  9% to 18%. In 2030, China's proportion  will be
50% higher  than many of its likely competitors  in Asia,  such as India, Indonesia,
Malaysia  or Vietnam.
This  aging  process  will  have  far-reaching  consequences.  Socially,  the
family will be strained,  perhaps more than in other countries,  because of China's
"one  child  policy".  Economically,  escalating  costs  associated  with  the  aging
population  could  put  China  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  relative  to  its
neighbors.  If current  systems are unchanged,  rising payroll  tax rates needed  to
cover sharply  increased  medical and pension  costs could dampen  China's growth  in
wages and employment,  induce evasion  and escape  to the informal  sector,  and will
inevitably  mean  large intergenerational  redistributions.  China  is considering  a
number  of reforms  to prevent  this  from  happening.
This paper focuses on the pension system, discusses  key policy  choices,  and
evaluates  their  impact  on costs and benefits  as China's  population  ages. Part  I
describes  the current  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) system  and the problems  it faces  in
the  short  and  long  run;  such  a  system  is very  sensitive  to  changing  old  age
dependency  rates. In a PAYG system, the pensions  of old people  today are financed
by contributions  of young workers  today, rather  than by their own savings  in the
past.  Parts  II and III simulate  several policy  options  for solving  the problems
that  will  be  faced  by  this  system  in the  near  future.  Simple  design  changes
involve reducing  the generous  benefit  rate, moving  toward price  rather than wage
indexation  of pensions  and raising the retirement  age. The trade-offs  among these
options  are  explored  in Part II. The central question  asked here  is: Will  these
1reforms  alone suffice to solve the aging problem?  Simulations  indicate  that the
answer  is "no".
More  basic  reforms  would  move  away  from  a  straight  PAYG  system  to  a
partially  funded  system  that  smooths  contributions  over  time.  In  addition,
partial  funding  can enhance  economic  growth  by increasing  capital  accumulation.
While  China's  rate  of voluntary  saving  is very  high now,  it may  not be so high
in the future,  so policies  that augment long term saving may be desirable.  If the
savings  are  well  invested,  this  ultimately  raises  the  affordable  benefit  or
lowers  the required  contribution  rate.
This  leads  directly  to a  key  issue--how  should  the  funds  be managed  to
maximize  the returns?  Who should  choose the investment  managers?  What incentives
and constraints  will the managers  face? Should  the funds be publicly  or privately
controlled?  Another  important  question  is the choice between defined benefit  and
defined contribution  plans.  In a defined benefit plan, pensions  are promised  that
usually  depend  on the number  of years worked  and the wage  in the last  few years
of employment,  but the future contribution  rate needed  to pay for these promises-
-and therefore  their credibility--is  unspecified.  In a defined  contribution  plan
the  contribution  rate  is  defined  and  the  pension  ultimately  depends  on
accumulated  contributions  plus  investment  returns, but future interest  rates and
benefit  amounts  are uncertain.
In Part  II the entire  system is assumed to be defined  benefit and any funds
that  accumulate  are  publicly  managed.  Part  III  investigates  the  effects  of
instituting  a multi-pillar  system  that includes  a modest  mandatory  tax-financed
basic  (defined)  benefit  plus  a  mandatory  fully  funded  defined  contribution
(individual  account)  scheme.  The  first pillar  is publicly  managed  and designed
to provide  a social  safety  net through  redistribution  targeted  toward  low income
workers,  while  the second pillar  requires  people  to save  in their own individual
accounts  and is privately  managed.  Thus the multi-pillar  system  combines publicly
and privately  managed  components,  that  are pay-as-you-go  and  defined  benefit,
funded  and  defined  contribution,  respectively.  (See  World  Bank  1994,  which
describes  this  system  and  its advantages  in a more  general  context).
Many Chinese officials  consider such a  system desirable--but  implementation
has  been  stalled  by the transitional  costs  that  would be implied.  Shifting  to
a multi-pillar  system  would  require paying  off the  implicit  debt  (honoring  the
2promises)  of  the  old  system  while  also  funding  the individual  accounts  in the  new
system,  a requirement  which, in  many countries,  has stopped such reforms. This
paper investigates ways in which this debt could be paid off, including the
feasibility  of  borrowing  in the  early  years  and repaying  later  on, with taxes  or
proceeds from SOE assets as alternative sources of funds for repayment.  The
Conclusion  summarizes  the  recommendations  that  come  out  of this  analysis,  as  well
as the inherent  risks.
Under  reasonable  assumptions,  it  seems  that  maintenance  of  the  current  PAYG
system will require a doubling of the current  payroll tax rate by 2030 and a
trebling by 2100.  Simple  design changes to the PAYG system substantially cut
these rate increase,  but do not appear  to be a sufficient  solution.  However,  a
combination of  these design  changes--together with partial  funding and  a
transition  to  a  multi-pillar  system  in  which  the  funds  are  competitively  managed-
-will  enable  China to  provide income  security  for its  aging  population  into the
twenty  first  century  with a lower  contribution  rate than  it currently  requires,
without large intergenerational  transfers,  and with beneficial effects on the
broader economy.
Simulations  show  that  the  pay-off  of the  pension  debt  is  quite  manageable,
in part because of the low initial  coverage rate for the country as a whole.
It  can be financed  by a 1.5%  payroll  tax  for 105  years  or 3% for  55  years (or  the
equivalent in other taxes or SOE assets), while the new system as a whole
(including the  transition cost)  would  require an  18%  payroll  tax--quite
reasonable  by international  standards,  for  an aging  population.
This transition  is greatly facilitated  by:
1)  borrowing  to  pay  off  the  pension  debt,  thereby  spreading  the transition
costs across several cohorts;
2)  coverage  extension  and  broader  pooling,  which  spread  the  costs  and  risks
of the  basic  benefit  across  a  wider  group  of  workers  and enterprises  within each
cohort; and
3) China's rapid rate of economic  growth, providing the benefit formula
does not require  pensions  to go up as fast  as wages.
Necessary  institutional  conditions  for  the success  of the  new system  are:
1) the ability  of the central  government  to obtain compliance from local
governments  and nonstate enterprises  and
32) financial  markets and regulatory  policies  that enable  the pension  funds
to be allocated  to their most  productive  uses and to earn  a rate of return  that
reflects  this productivity.
These results should hold for other countries  as well, especially  for Asian
countries  that  presently  have  high  growth  and low coverage  rates.
II.  The Current  System:  Problems  and Alternative  Solutions
The formal pension  system  in China is largely urban-based,  PAYG and offers
a  defined  benefit  that  depends  on  the  worker's  wage  in  the  last  year  of
employment.  Covered  retirees  also  receive  housing,  medical  benefits,  other
services  and  inflation  subsidies.  In urban  areas  the pension  system  has  been
largely  focused  on  state  owned  enterprises  (SOE's)  and  older  collective
enterprises  (COE's)  . Only  a minority  of workers  are covered in the new non-state
sector  (joint  ventures,  joint  stock  companies,  private  companies,  foreign
enterprises,  self-employed) ,  which  accounts  for  a  rapidly  growing  share  of
employment.  Very  few workers  in rural  areas,  including  workers  in the  rapidly
expanding  township  and  village  enterprises  (TVE's),  are  part  of  any  formal
pension  plan.  Less  than  a  quarter  of  the  working-age  population  over-all  is
covered.
The  Short  Run Problem:  High  Costs  for SOE's  and Limited  Pooling
During  the period  of  the Cultural  Revolution,  each  state  enterprise  was
responsible  for paying  the pension  benefits  of its own workers,  on a PAYG basis.
This meant  that older enterprises  with many retirees had far higher pension  costs
than  young  enterprises.  Although  wages  were  low,  partial  compensation  was
provided  in the  form of high wage  replacement  rates upon  retirement.  Since  the
proportion  of old people  was generally  small and the government  stood  ready  to
fund  any  deficits,  this  high  cost  and the  disparity  among  enterprises  did  not
matter  in a planned  economy.  However,  it became  an increasing  problem  when  the
Cultural  Revolution  came  to  an  end  and  China's  economy  became  more  market-
oriented.  Declining  state  enterprises  found it difficult  to keep  their  pension
promises,  uneven  payroll  taxes exacerbated  their inability  to compete,  and banks
were pressured  to help enterprises  meet their obligations  by making  unsound loans
that  might  never  be repaid.
4In response  to the difficulties  enterprises  have  had  in paying  pensions,
over  the past  decade  most municipalities  have tried to "pool" the contributions,
benefits  and  risks  across  enterprises.  Pooling  has  eliminated  some  of  the
problems,  but  since  the state  sector  is growing  slowly  relative  to the  rest  of
the economy,  the ratio of pensioners  to workers  is high  for the pool  as a whole.
Moreover,  since  pooling  is  incomplete,  risk-sharing  is  limited  and  state
enterprises  still do not operate on a level playing  field with each other or with
nonstate  enterprises.  In some  cities  only  part  of  the  total  pension  bill  is
pooled,  so that enterprises  with  large proportions  of retirees  still pay higher
contribution  rates,  and  different  groups  of enterprises  in a  locality  (SOE's,
COE's)  often belong  to different  pools. For example,  in Shenyang,  each enterprise
is  supposed  to pay  40%  of  its  own  pension  bill,  plus  an  18%  payroll  tax  to
finance  the remaining  60% on a pooled  basis.
Some  municipalities  have  a  concentration  of declining  state  enterprises
with many  retirees  and few workers,  while others have  relatively  new enterprises
with  few  retirees.  The pools  can provide  pensions  to workers  if a small  number
of enterprises  go bankrupt,  but their  capacity  to absorb  a wave  of bankruptcies
has not  been  tested.  Pension  portability  is usually  permitted  within  the pool,
but since  the pools  are limited in scope so too is worker  mobility.  Portability
of pensions  across  municipalities  and provinces  requires  special  arrangements
which  may  not  be  feasible.  The  management  and  record-keeping  burden  of  the
pension  system  still  rests  heavily  on  the  individual  enterprises;  potential
economies  of scale  from  centralized  administration  are not realized.
In  addition,  SOE's  in  financial  difficulty  are  sometimes  excused  from
paying  their  share  of  the  pension  burden,  eleven  industries  are  allowed  to
maintain  their own pools on a nation-wide  basis,  and nonstate  enterprises  which
constitute  the growth  sector  are only  sparsely  covered.  The  latter  groups  tend
to have  a relatively  young  work  force and  few retirees;  their  exclusion  avoids
cross-subsidization  away  from  them  and  keeps  the  dependency  and  contribution
rates  high  for the others.
Benefit  rates  continue  high  relative  to wages,  in part  because  (partial)
wage  indexation  of pensions  is used.  The average  replacement  rate  is over  80%
of  wages,  compared  with  40-60%  in  other  countries.  And  the  duration  of
retirement  is long,  since  retirement  ages  are  low  relative  to the  rising  life
5expectancy  in China.  The high  costs of these  high benefits  lead to evasion and
exemptions,  which raise the required contribution  rate still higher. Although
pension costs are only 15% of the covered wage bill, the average break-even
payroll  tax rate  exceeds  20%,  higher  than  in  most  OECD  countries.  The cumulative
tax for all social insurance often exceeds 35%, the cumulative cost of all
benefits for retirees is much greater,  and imperfect  labor  markets may prevent
these costs  from being passed on  to workers  in the form of  lower wages.
Consequently,  an enterprise  may lose  competitiveness  not because its  efficiency
in its core business is low, but because it, or its municipality, has many
retirees,  hence  high  costs  of  pensions  and  other  generous  social  services (health
care,  housing)  that  they  provide  to  retirees,  a  legacy  from  the  past.
Restructuring of SOE's has been slowed down by these costs.  (For further
information on historical background and current problems see Friedman and
Hausman).
Thus, pooling at the municipal level  alone has not solved the short run
financial  problem  of the  SOE  pension  system  or its  impact  on  the  broader  economy.
The Lone Run Problem: PoDulation  Aaina  and Limited Coveraa.
Added to this immediate problem in the state sector is the longer run
problem caused  by rapid population  aging. The system old age dependency ratio
(i.e.  the number of pensioners divided by the number of covered workers)  will
double from 211 in 1995 to 42% in 2030, continuing  to 55% in 2050 and 71% in
2100,  respectively,  if  retirement  age,  urban/rural  migration  and  coverage  do not
change (Table  1)  . Realizing that the costs implied  under a PAYG system would
become unaffordable and distortionary, the Chinese government is anxious to
partially prefund its future  pension obligations.
Prefunding  would  not  only  smooth  the  contribution  rate  over  time  and  reduce
intergenerational  transfers,  it  would  also  enhance  economic  growth  by
accumulating  savings  for  long  term  investments  and  facilitating  financial  market
development.  However,  in  China  as in  other  countries,  it is  proving  difficult  to
finance the transition from PAYG to funding--paying the benefits of current
retirees while also prefunding future retirees. Because of  the desire  for
prefunding,  individual  retirement  accounts  for  covered  workers  are being set  up
in most municipalities,  but because  of the  practical  difficulties  these tend  to
be 'notional"  accounts, with bookkeeping entrees and few real assets. From a
6financing  point of view,  notional  accounts  are not very different  from PAYG  (see
Appendix).
Another  aspect  of the long run problem  is the fact  that  the vast  majority
of Chinese  workers,  including  most  urban  workers  in nonstate  enterprises,  most
rural workers  and all self-employed  and agricultural  workers  are not covered  by
any  formal  pension  plan.  As the  extended  family  support  system  breaks  down  due
to  the  one-child  policy  and  increased  migration  from  farm  to city,  many  old
people  will  find  themselves  without  any means  of  financial  security.  Defined
contribution  plans  were  recently  offered  to rural  workers  by the government  on
a voluntary  basis,  but the small contributions  made  and the low  (negative  real)
interest  rate  paid  imply  that only  a negligible  annuity  will  be available  when
these workers  retire.  This problem  could  explode  in the future  if preventative
action  is not  taken  now.  Extending  mandatory  coverage  to the  dynamic  nonstate
sector,  including  the rural TVE's,  in a well-structured  system  would enhance  the
long  term  security  of  these  workers--but  at existing  payroll  tax  rates  might
choke  off  the current  rapid growth  rate  of their enterprises.
Alternative  Policy  Solutions:  Simple  Design  Change  Versus  Basic  Reform
The remainder  of this paper  contrasts  three alternative  policy  approaches
to  solving  the  immediate  SOE  problem  as  well  as  the  longer  run  problems  of
population  aging  and  incomolete  coverage:
(1)  continuation  of  pure  PAYG,  with  design  reforms  such  as  reduced
replacement  rates,  use  of price  rather  than  wage  indexation,  increased
retirement  age,  and extended  coverage  together  with  expanded  pools;
(2) partial  prefunding  of the single  pillar  defined  benefit  plan;
(3) partial  prefunding  in  the  context  of  a  multi-pillar  system  which
includes  two mandatory  parts--a  tax-financed  basic benefit  (Pillar I) plus
a fully  funded  defined  contribution  scheme  (Pillar II).
Two  sub-cases  of  the  multi-pillar  system  are  distinguished--one  in which  the
current  generation  of  workers  pays  off  the  old  pension  debt  (finances  the
transition)  through  a high  payroll  tax; and a second  in which borrowing  spreads
this burden  over many  generations.
These  alternative  policy  solutions  imply  different  time  patterns  of
required  contribution  rates,  which  is one  focus of this paper.  The time pattern
of contribution  rates  has an efficiency  dimension:  If the distortionary  effect
7of higher  taxes  depends  on the square  of the tax rate,  then  tax rates  that  are
uneven over time may increase  the total distortionary  impact on labor supply,  its
allocation  to the informal  versus  the formal sectors,  and the degree  of evasion.
The  pattern  of  tax  rates  over  time  also  has  a  bearing  on  intergenerational
equity:  If one believes  that each generation  should pay equivalent  tax rates  for
equivalent  benefit  rates, tax smoothing  is equitable,  while if one believes  that
wealthier  generations  should  pay  a progressively  higher  tax  burden  and  should
face negative  redistributions,  one would probably  want  a rising  tax burden  over
time.  But  viewed  from  the perspective  of procedural  fairness,  one might  argue
that the present generation  should not impose an increasing  tax burden  on future
generations,  who are not  around  to fend  for themselves.  Finally,  very  high  tax
rates  may  simply  not  be  politically  acceptable,  and  may  imply  that  benefit
promises  will  be broken  in the future.
Simulations  show  that, while the simple design  reforms  slow down  the rise
in  required  contribution  rate  substantially,  in  the  long  run  under  PAYG
population  aging dominates,  implying  high dependency  and cost  rates and a large
pension  debt  from which  it will  be even more  difficult  to escape.  In contrast,
the  shift  to a multi-pillar  system  is not economically  or politically  feasible
in the short run if the current  generation  has  to pay the full transition  costs,
which  raises  their  contribution  rates  substantially.
However,  if the design changes  are accompanied  by a transition  to a multi-
pillar  system  that  is financed  by borrowing,  both  the  short  run  and  long  run
peaks  of  required  tax  rates  are  avoided.  Initially  the  payments  to  current
pensioners  are debt  financed,  but as these pensioners  die off the debt  is repaid
out of taxes or SOE assets. As one solution:  A payroll  tax rate of 17.4%,  carried
between  1995 and 2100,  is sufficient  to fully finance the basic benefit  (7.3%),
the  individual  accounts  (8.5%) and the pay-off  of the existing  debt  to current
pensioners  and older workers  (1.6t), while yielding  an expected  long run pension
benefit  that  is 60 percent  of the average  wage  in the economy  or 55 percent  of
the  final  year's  wage  for  the  average  member  of the  retiring  cohort.  It also
builds  up a large  stock of long  term saving  for productive  investment.  China's
high growth  rate, when  combined  with price rather than wage  indexation,  plus  the
possibility  of extended  pension  coverage,  yield a financial  surplus  in the short
8run  that  can  be transformed  into  a long  run  benefit  via  this  shift to  a  preferred
pension system.
III. Effect.  of A. Continued  and Reformed  PAYG System
This section  analyses the impact  of a continued  PAYG system  on the level
and time  pattern  of  pension  system  costs,  given  China's  demographic  and  economic
projections.  Design reforms considered are a  reduced replacement rate, an
increased  retirement  age,  and a shift  to price  rather than  wage indexation--all
of which help, but not enough. These results also apply to a pure notional
account system,  which is similar  to the system  that some  Chinese cities  are now
using (see  Appendix).  The impact  of partially  funding  this  defined  benefit  plan
is also considered.
Basic  AsSumDtions
For pension planning very long time horizons are essential, both at the
individual  and  economy-wide  levels.  From  the  time  a  worker  enters  the  labor  force
and begins retirement  planning to the time he or she dies and stops collecting
a pension, a period of 70 or more years  may elapse. If individuals  do not plan
ahead  for this  long  period, they  may find  themselves  with insufficient  resources
at the end of life.
At the societal level it is very difficult to change old age policies
abruptly,  because existing  policies  have been built into  peoples' expectations
and  plans. In  particular,  it  is  difficult  to  change  expenditures  on cohorts  that
have already retired. For example, the legal  retirement  age can only be raised
gradually, the increase only applies to newly retiring cohorts, and pension
benefits  are  rarely reduced after retirement except through inflation and
indexation  methods.  Thus,  policies  can have  very  different  effects  on  costs over
the long and short run; to get a  full picture it is necessary to simulate
alternative pension systems over a period lasting 100 years or more--in this
paper until 2100--albeit  recognizing  that forecasts  of the basic economic and
demographic  environment  becomtte  less reliable  as we go out further in time.
9For these  simulations  we start with World Bank  population  projections  for
China,  1995-2100.1  Our baseline  and alternative  assumptions  about  the rate  of
real  wage  growth,  interest  rate  and other  economic  and policy  parameters  over
this period  are given  in Table  2  . In most  countries  the interest  rate  tends  to
exceed  the rate of wage  growth  by more  than  2%, over  long periods.  But  in China
the opposite  is true at present.  China's  rate  of real wage  growth  over  the past
decade  has  been  almost  6% annually,  while  the  real  interest  rate  available  to
domestic  savers  in recent  years  has  been  negative,  due  to controlled  nominal
rates  that are less  than the inflation  rate  (1994 Statistical  Yearbook  of China,
Beijing:  State  Statistical  Bureau).  In our baseline  simulations  we accordingly
use a rate of wage growth  that exceeds the interest  rate initially  and vice versa
after  2011,  assuming  that  financial  markets  have  been  reformed  and wage  growth
has slowed  down  in the interim.  We also carry out sensitivity  analysis  to these
variables  by  experimenting  with  scenarios  in  which  wage  growth  is  lower  and
financial  market  reform  faster  or slower.
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The  continuation  of current  evasion  and  exemption  rates  of 25%  are  also
assumed.  Enforcement  techniques  will  probably  improve  in the  future,  reducing
these  leakages,  but the expansion  of the nonstate  and informal  sectors will have
the opposite  effect,  so as a baseline  the continuation  of the 25% noncompliance
rate is probably  not unreasonable.  It is also modest by comparison  with other low
and middle  income countries,  where workers often qualify for benefits  despite  the
fact that their enterprises  have not paid the full contributions;  this raises  the
break-even  contribution  rate, possibly  inducing  greater  evasion.  Obviously,  if
China  is  able  to  reduce  its  noncompliance  rate,  this  would  correspondingly
improve  the  financial  situation  of its pension  system. One  of the best  ways  to
do  so  is to choose  a system  that  costs  less  and  reduces  incentives  to evade.
1 These  projections  assume  increasing  life  expectancy,  while  the  Chinese
have  used  projections  which  do not take  this  into account.  Therefore,  our  data
show a continuing  increase  in the demographic  dependency  rate  (Table 1) while the
Chinese  data  imply a levelling  off after  2030.
2  In addition  to the  economy-wide  wage  growth,  which  is uniform  for  all
cohorts,  we  assume  that  for  the  first  30 years  of  working  life  the  worker
receives  a wage  increase  for experience  and on-the-job  training  of 1% per  year.
While  age-earnings  profiles  have been realtively  flat in China  in the past,  they
will probably  become  steeper in the future, as the transition  to a market economy
proceeds.  Thus  the average  wage  of the  retiring  cohort  will  be higher  than  the
average  economy-wide  wage.  The  same  pension  amount  will  then  yield  a  lower
proportion  of  final  year's  wage  (called  the  replacement  rate)  than  of  the
economy-wide  wage  (herein called  the benefit  rate).
10Another  method  is  to  choose  a  system,  such  as  a  multi-pillar  system  with  a
defined contribution  component,  whose costs and financial  sustainability  are less
sensitive  to evasion  rates,  as illustrated  in this  paper.
The  urban  share  of  the population  is  27%,  rural  workers  are  not  in any
mandatory  system,  and  civil  servants  are  in a separate  scheme  not  included  in
this analysis,  so only  20% of all workers  are covered  in the baseline  scenario.
In  an  alternative  scenario,  urban  in-migration,  rural  industry  and  coverage
increase.  This raises  the urban share of workers  to 46%, the share in cities plus
rural  industry  to 84% and  the total  coverage  rate  to 63% by 2050  .3
It is difficult  to capture  the parameters  of the  current  Chinese  system
since each city has a somewhat  different  program and the picture presented  by the
data  is sometimes  different  from the stated plan. As an approximation  of China's
current  system  we use a PAYG  defined benefit  system  with  an average pension  for
new  retirees  that  is 80% of the average  wage  in the economy  and replaces  73% of
the final year's  salary  (see footnote  2), indexation  to prices  plus  50% of real
wages  (herein  called  50%  real  wage  indexation),  and  retirement  at  age  55 for
women,  60  for  men. 4 These  parameters  are  changed  in  the  reform  scenarios.
Differences  across  municipalities  and provinces  are  ignored.
Survivors'  insurance  is assumed to take its current form--75%  of the normal
pension  for  one year  only.  Disability  annuities  are  assumed  to be provided  at
half  the normal  retirement  replacement  rate.  Early  retirement  benefits  are  75%
of  the  normal  replacement  rate.  Administrative  costs  are  a  modest  3%  of
expenditures  in the  existing  PAYG  system  and  3% of revenues  in the  individual
3  In these  calculations,  "urban" means current  cities. Additionally,  many
currently  rural  areas  will  become  "urbanized"  through  growth  in density  and
industry.  Urban  migration  in these  simulations  apply  only  to workers  under  age
35. This means that, although  the migration  is assumed to come to an end in 2050,
the urban  share continues  to increase  to 2100 and beyond  because  of population
maturation--the  death of cohorts that did not experience  in-migration,  and their
replacement  by cohorts that did migrate.  Since population  growth  is projected  to
become  negligible  after  2050,  the continued  growth  in urban  population  implies
a small  decline  in rural population.  See Table  1.
4  National  officials  claim  they want  to reduce  the benefit  rate below  80%,
but data  suggest  that the average pension  has been about  80t of the average  wage
over  the last  few years.  The normal  retirement  age has been  60 for men,  55 for
women,  but  this  simply  gives  us a probability  distribution  of  retirement  ages
since  many  workers  retire  earlier  or work  later.  The  inflation  adjustment  has
been  tied  to nominal  rather  than  real  wage  growth,  on an ad  hoc  basis  in  the
past, but  is gradually  becoming  systematized.  Depending  on the relative  size of
the real wage  increase  versus the inflationary  increase,  nominal  wage indexation
of 40-80%  may imply that  pensions  are going up faster  or slower  than prices;  we
use 50% real wage  indexation  as a baseline.  See footnote  7 for more details  about
inflation  adjustment.
11accounts  of the  new  multi-pillar  system  (that do not  yet  have  expenditures);
actual  administrative  costs  are  unknown  but  are probably  much  higher,  thereby
raising the required  contribution  rate. These ratios are retained  throughout  this
analysis.
Cost  of the PAYG  System  Under  Alternative  Reforms
Table  3 compares  the annual  break-even  contribution  rates  of the current
system  and  several  reform  scenarios,  all  retaining  the  PAYG  defined  benefit
format.  The break-even  contribution  rate  is the payroll  tax rate  that  will  just
balance revenues  and expenditures  on a year-to-year  basis, given the covered  wage
base  and  existing  defined  benefit  formula.
Table  4, column  1, presents,  for the same  scenarios,  the uniform  or time-
invariant  contribution  rate that would balance  the system  for the entire period,
1996-2100,  instead of permitting  the rate to change annually.  It may be that  2100
is  an  overly-long  time  horizon,  given  that  uncertainty  about  the  underlying
parameters  increases  as we move  further into the future. Therefore,  columns 2 and
3 show  the two uniform  rates  that would balance  the system  separately  for 1996-
2150 and 2151-2100.  The rate for the second half  of the century  is always  higher
than  that  for the  first half,  because  the dependency  rate  rises  through  time--
suggesting  that  a cut-off  of 2050  is deceptive  unless  one makes  some  estimate
about  what  lies  around  the corner.
The time invariant  contribution  rate, whether  to 2050 or 2100 or some other
year,  implies that  funds will be accumulated  during  the early part  of the period
and used  up in the latter part--that  is, the system becomes partially  pre-funded
instead of pure  PAYG. This in turn raises the question  of whether  the funds will
be managed  to maximize  the rate of return--a  topic that will be discussed  in Part
III.  In Part  II we simply  use the uniform  contribution  rate  as a concise  way to
compare  the  long  run  costs  of  different  reform  scenarios  in a  single-pillar
system,  taking  the  interest  rate  as given.
The current system. Table 3, row 1, shows the break-even  contribution  rates
that would  be needed  for the current system, given China's demographics  and high
labor  force  participation  rate.  In  this  baseline  scenario,  break-even
contribution  rates rise  from  20% in 1995 to 37% in 2030, 49% in 2050 and  60% in
2100.  If  China  chose  to  partially  pre-fund  the  present  system,  the  uniform
contribution  rate that  would  cover all costs until  2100  is 44%  (Table 4, row  1,
12column  1). If the contribution  rate  rose  instead to 32t, this would  carry  China
to 2050  (column  2),  but  for  the  second  half  of the  century  the  required  rate
would  jump  to 55%  (column 3).
Required  contribution  rates  are even  higher  under  the slow grow  scenario
(row  2)  ,  since revenues  decrease  commensurately  with wage growth but expenditures
decrease  at a lesser rate  (because pensions  are only partially  indexed to wages).
If the high  payroll  tax  is borne by workers,  this  high  contribution  rate  means
much  lower  take-home  pay than  they would  otherwise  get.  If borne  by employers,
it means less competitiveness  on international  markets and more unemployment.  In
either  case  it means  that  the  current  generation  of  pensioners  has  gotten  a
bargain  for which  future  generations  pay  a very  high  price.
Rows  3-6  retain  the  PAYG  financing  method  and baseline  scenario  but  add
alternative  policy  reforms.  Row  3  reduces  the  benefit  rate  to  60%  and  the
replacement  rate to 55% for new retirees;  row 4 increases  the  retirement  age  (4
months  per year for women until 60 is reached  in 2010, then 2  months  per year  for
both  men  and  women  until  65  is reached  in 2040)5; rows  5  and  6  impose  price
instead  of  50-  real  wage  indexation;  and  rows  7 and  8 assume  rapid  or delayed
financial  market  reform,  respectively.  Finally,  row 9 shows  the impact  of  all
these policy  reforms  if  undertaken  simultaneously  under PAYG and row 10 shows the
combined  impact  when  coverage  is  extended  to  increased  urban  migrants  and  to
rural  workers  who  have  shifted  out  of  agriculture  into  TVE's  and  private
companies.
Benefit  rate  and  retirement  age:  the  high  cost  of  early  retirement.  China's
replacement  rate  is very  high by international  standards  and its retirement  age
is  low,  hence  its  expected  duration  of  retirement  of  19 years  is  also  high
compared  with other  countries.  If the retirement  age is not raised,  the duration
of retirement  will  jump  to 25 years by 2050, given  life  expectancy  projections
(Table 1).  Reforming  these  two design  features  has a powerful  downward  effect
on costs,  especially  in the long  run. The uniform  contribution  rate  to 2100  is
cut 10 percentage  points,  one quarter  of total  cost, for each of these  reforms.
'  Some  Chinese  workers  retire  under  special  early  retirement  programs.  In
these  simulations  we assume  these programs  continue  to exist  in their  present
form when  the normal  retirement  age increases.  It is possible,  on the one hand,
that  the  allowable  early  retirement  age will  rise  if the normal  retirement  age
increases.  On the other hand,  it is also possible  that more people will find some
way  to get  early  retirement  if the normal  age  rises.  These  simulations  assume
unchanged  early  retirement  propensities.
13If  the  uniform  rate  iB  allowed  to change  in  2051, it  is cut 6-7  percentage  points
for the first  half of the century,  but much more--5.4-18  percentage  points--for
the second half (Tables  3 and 4, rows 1, 3 and 4, respectively).
Figure . shows  the  trade-off  between  retirement  age  and contribution  rate,
holding  benefit rate constant  at 60%, and Figure 2 shows  the trade-off  between
retirement  age and benefit  rate,  holding contribution  rate  constant.
6 A gradual
rise in retirement  age from 60 to 70 for men and women reduces the break-even
contribution  rate by 1-2  percentage points per year of increase (Figure  1). A
gradual rise in retirement  age (holding  contribution  rate constant) raises the
feasible  benefit  rate  by 3-4  percentage  points  per  year  of increase (Figure  2).
The increase in retirement age has a double impact--reducing lifetime
payouts  while  increasing  lifetime  contributions.  Since  raising  the  retirement  age
is  a sensitive  issue  in  many  countries,  including  China,  it  is  important  for  them
to  be  aware of  this  high  opportunity  cost. Indeed,  many countries  want to reduce
the retirement  age to reduce  unemployment--and  China  also encouraged  people to
retire  early  when shedding  labor  from  SOE's.  But  actually,  early  retirement  only
hides true unemployment--which may be  attractive politically but  is costly
economically.  Pensions  are  more  expensive  and last  for  a  much longer  time  period
than unemployment  benefits,  hence  require  a higher  payroll  tax that  raises  labor
costs.  Retired  persons  are less  likely  to  look for  jobs  than  unemployed  workers.
For  both  reasons,  an early  retirement  age  may  lead  to  a lower  level  of  employment
and output. Instituting  a higher  retirement  age to increase  the supply  of labor
will be  particularly valuable after 2030, when the working age population
contracts  due  to  population  aging--but  to  have  it  in  place  then,  the  process  must
begin soon.
Price versus  wage indexation.  Only the shift from 50% real  wage to price
indexation  affects  current  pensioners,  and this  saves  an  additional  6  percentage
points  in  the  long run  (row 5)  . Price  indexation maintains  the  absolute
purchasing power of the pension, while wage indexation maintains its value
6  In  these figures,  it  is  assumed  that  the  retirement  age for  women  has been
raised  to 60  by 2010,  and  the increase  in  retirement  age  depicted  takes  place  at
the rate of 4 months per year, starting in 2011, for both men and women. The
benefit  rate is  held constant  at 60% in Figure  1 and starts  at 60% in Figure  2.
The  break-even  contribution  rate,  of course,  changes  over  time. In  Figure  2,  the
contribution  rate  is  held  constant  in  the  year  2050  and in  Figure  1  we report  the
changes that occur in  2050, at  which time all the effects of  the raised
retirement  age should  be observed.
14relative  to the average  wage  in the economy.  If real wages  were  growing  slowly,
say at 1t annually,  as in many OECD countries,  the savings  from price  indexation
would  be  much  smaller  (compare  rows  2  and  6).  China,  with  its  expected  high
growth  rate,  is well  positioned  to achieve  substantial  cost  saving  from  price
rather  than  wage  indexation.
However,  the cost of this saving  is the deteriorating  position  of retirees
relative  to workers:  if the real  wage  growth  rate  is 5.5% and  price  indexation
is used,  the retiree  who started  with a benefit  that was 80% of the average  wage
gets  only  40%  of  the  new  average  wage  after  13 years,  and  only  21%  after  25
years.  In  contrast,  under  50%  real  wage  indexation,  the  relative  pension
deteriorates  much  slower--to  41%  of  the average  wage  after  25 years--but  this
indexation  method  costs  more,  as we saw above  (Figure 3).
For a given  cost,  China  faces a key  trade-off  between  the relative  well-
being  of young  versus  old retirees,  through  the selection  of indexation  method.
For example,  holding  the  (2050) contribution  rate constant,  China  could  choose
an  80%  benefit  rate  combined  with  price  indexation,  or  a  69%  benefit  rate
combined  with  50% real wage  indexation.  This trade-off  is depicted  in Figure  4,
which  shows  that  pensions  are  initially  higher  with  price  indexation,  but  the
very old are better  off with real wage  indexation.  The best  choice  for China  and
other  countries  depends  on how much pensioners  value income  in their early years
of retirement  relative  to that in their later years, and whether  they care mainly
about the absolute  value of their purchasing  power  or their position  relative  to
workers7.
Financial  market  reform.  Currently  interest  rates are controlled  and,  for
domestic  savers,  are  very  low  (even  negative  in  real  terms)  in  China.  In
addition,  types of financial  instruments  available  are limited.  Financial  market
reform  which  would  include  increased  diversification  in  instruments,  greater
freedom  for private  financial  institutions,  and liberalized  interest  rates,  is
important  for China's  continued  development.
7  The  actual  system  in China  is sornewhat  different  from  either  pure  price
or  wage  indexation,  in  many  cities.  After  an  aggregate  inflation  adjustment
amount  is determined,  usually  based  on  nominal  wage  increases,  this  is often
distributed  on  a  flat  basis  to  all  pensioners,  rather  than  being  prorated
according  to  their  pensions.  Recent  retirees  with  relatively  high  wages  and
pensions  may  thus  get  less  than  price  indexation  would  dictate  while  older
cohorts  may  get more--another  way to reduce  disparities  in relative  well-being
among  cohorts.
15Here  we simply  test  the  impact  of interest  rate  reform  on the  financial
sustainability  of the pension  system. In general,  the interest  rate has no effect
on the annual break-even  contribution  rates in a PAYG system,  since revenues  and
expenditures,  by definition,  balance  every  year  and  do not  earn  an investment
return.  But  once  partial  funding  is  introduced,  the  interest  rate  can  make  a
difference.
It turns out that  speeding  up financial  reform,  so that  the real  interest
rate is 3% instead of 0 between  1996 and 2010, has only a small effect,  reducing
the uniform  contribution  rate by less  than  1 percentage  point  (row 7). Pension
reserves  are  very  small  at  this  point,  so  the  interest  rate  is  relatively
unimportant.  (See Table 8 and discussion  below)  . On the other hand, delaying  the
financial  market  reform  and depressing  interest  rates beyond  2011, when  reserves
have become  larger, -aises the required contribution  rate substantially  (row 8).
Thus, China has a breathing  spell, but if it does not act within  this period,  its
problems  will  grow.
Combined  reforms  and  coverage  expansion.  These  combined  reforms--an
increase  in the  interest  rate,  a decrease  in the  benefit  rate  to 60%  and  the
replacement  rate  to 55%, an increase  of the retirement  age to 65 and a shift  to
price indexation- -do indeed reduce expenditures  substantially.  Both annual break-
even  rates  and  the  uniform  contribution  rate  eventually  fall  to  half  their
initial  (unreformed)  values.  Nevertheless,  population  aging  causes  the  annual
break-even  contribution  rate  to exceed  20% by 2030; it reaches  27% and is still
rising  in 2100  (row 9).
One method  that many countries  have used to keep  their PAYG systems  afloat
is to gradually  expand  coverage,  together  with broader  pooling  to unify  rates.
This  method  is especially  tempting  in China,  where  only  20% of the total  labor
force  is now  covered  and where pension  expenditures  are less than  2% of GDP  (as
compared  with  10-15%  in most  European  countries).
Rural workers will increasingly  move to the cities as mobility  restrictions
are lifted, most  of these will  enter the nonstate  sector, and those remaining  in
the countryside  will  move  out  of agriculture  into  TVE's  and  private  companies
where enforcement  of contributions  to a formal mandatory  system  is more feasible.
The  pros  and  cons  of covering  these groups  are discussed  in Part  III.  Here  we
simply  assess  the  impact  on system  costs.  As young  workers  from  newly  covered
16groups  enter the system,  this reduces the dependency  rate and break-even  payroll
tax  rate  initially,  because  these  groups  are  contributing  but  do not  yet  have
eligible  retirees.  However  eventually,  as coverage  expansion  comes to an end and
the newly covered workers  receive pensions,  the required  contribution  rate rises
sharply.
This  process  is demonstrated  in row  10, which  assumes  that  migration  of
rural  workers  to  the  cities  and  coverage  of  rural  workers  is  expanded  (as
detailed  in Table  2)  . Reduced  replacement  rates,  price  indexation,  increased
retirement  age and financial  rnarket  reform are also assumed,  enabling  comparison
with  row  9.  We see  that  coverage  expansion  does  indeed  depress  the break-even
contribution  rate  still  further,  but  its  effect  is concentrated  in the  early
years.  Once  coverage  expansion  slows down, annual break-even  contribution  rates
rise  steeply  and  almost  converge  with  those  for  the  system  without  coverage
expansion.  Only pre-funding,  a move to a more uniform contribution  rate, can stop
this  process.
Thus  coverage  expansion  as a solution  to the problem  of population  aging
is deceptive  and  dangerous  if the PAYG  system  is retained  because  it may  lull
countries  into  complacency,  but  the  problem  eventually  reappears,  in  a  more
intractable  and  socially  divisive  form.  That  is,  the  pension  debt,  which  is
relatively  small at present,  expands together with coverage,  limiting the choices
that will be open  to China later on. The transition  to a partially  funded  system
is much  more  feasible  for China at present,  before  coverage  expansion  has  taken
place.
IV. Partial  Funding  in a Multi-Pillar  System
China  is interested  in shifting  to a partially  funded system  to eliminate
the negative  effects  of the high  future tax rates that would be implied by a pure
PAYG  system.  A partially  funded  system  also has a positive  advantage:  it helps
to build  up a stock of retirement  savings that  can be used  to develop  financial
markets  and  can  be  channelled  through  these  markets  to  finance  long  term
investments--both  of which  will  enhance  China's  economic  growth.  Whether  these
results  will  be achieved  depends  in large part  on how the funds are managed  and
allocated.  The  first  part  of this  section discusses  this  issue.
17While recognizing  the advantages  of prefunding,  most Chinese municipalities
have  been  unable  to achieve  it so far,  because  of the heavy  burden  of  current
pension  obligations.  The second  part of this section  describes  how a transition
to a partially  funded  multi-pillar  system  can be made,  using  a combination  of
borrowing,  taxes,  sale of SOE assets,  and  coverage  extension.
The Rationale  for a Multi-Pillar  System
The simplest  way to achieve  partial  funding and smooth  contribution  rates
over  time  is to maintain  the  defined  benefit  structure  and  simply  build  up a
reserve  fund  to meet  future  needs.  Many  countries  have  attempted  to use  this
method,  but  few have  succeeded.  The  results  of this method,  if it worked  well,
have been  shown  in Table  4. Rows  9 and  10 seem  to imply  that  if China  reformed
its  system  by  design  changes,  using  the proceeds  to build  a reserve,  it could
live  with  a  contribution  rate  of  less  than  20%  well  into  the  twenty  first
century.  Unfortunately,  in other  countries  partially  funded  defined  benefit
systems,  with  the reserves  centrally  managed,  have not  worked  well,  because  of
upward  pressures  on  expenditures  and  downward  pressures  on  returns  from
investments  and  growth.  For  the  calculations  in  Table  4  pension  benefits,
investment  returns  and wage growth  were  taken as exogenously  given,  but evidence
from  other  countries  indicates  that  choice  of  system  impacts  the  ability  to
constrain  benefits  and expand  revenues.
One  problem  that  frequently  develops  in partially  funded  defined  benefit
systems  is the  likelihood  of continued  pressure  to raise  the promised  benefit
level,  if a reserve  fund does develop.  Even  if design  reforms  such as a reduced
replacement  rate  are  put  in place  initially,  they  may  not  last  if politicians
cannot  withstand  these  pressures.  In particular,  policy-makers  may  find  it
difficult  to raise  the  retirement  age as longevity  increases,  if reserves  have
accumulated;  this  could  potentially  be  a problem  in China.  So in  the  end  the
funds  disappear.
A  more  central  problem  is  that  under  the  present  structure  government
control  over  the  investments  of  the  funds  would  be  needed,  since  ultimately
governments  (in China's  case, local governments)  have  the obligation  to pay  the
defined  benefits.  But  the experience  of many  countries  suggests  that  publicly
managed  funds are likely  to pursue  political  rather than  economic  objectives  and
therefore  do  not  maximize  the  returns  to  the  funds  or  the  productivity  of
18capital.  For example,  during  the 1980's centrally  managed  pension  funds in many
countries  lost money because they were required to invest primarily  in government
bonds  or  in loans  to failing  state  enterprises,  at low nominal  interest  rates
that  became  negative  when  inflation  rose  (World Bank  1994).
We observe  a  similar  phenomenon  in China  today.  Currently  those  pension
reserves  that  do accumulate  are managed  by municipal  authorities,  although  the
central  government  requires  them to invest mainly  in government  bonds  and short
term bank  deposits.  Interest  rates are controlled  by the central government  and
in  recent  years  the  rate  of  return  has  been  negative--less  than  the  rate  of
inflation  and  far  below  the  rate  of wage  growth.  It is unclear  whether  local
authorities  actually  follow these rules; monitoring  is difficult  and incomplete.
But other problems  arise with  those funds that are invested  at the discretion  of
the  municipal  authorities:  they  are  all  retained  locally,  sometimes  lent  to
failing  SOE's.  Not  only  is  international  diversification  prohibited,  even
investments  beyond  the municipality  are unlikely  to be chosen. And no competitive
mechanism  exists  to encourage  capital  mobility  that would  maximize  returns  and
social  productivity,  or to diminish  the  role  of those  municipalities  that  are
doing  a poor  job.
Closely  related  are other  dangers  that  could arise  when  governments  have
exclusive  access  to publicly  managed  pension  funds. The nontransparency  of this
arrangement  may  induce  them  to  spend  wastefully  or  to  use  excessive  deficit
finance.  If part  of the funds are invested  in private  securities,  this raises  the
specter  of back-door  nationalization,  as the government  may be in a position  to
influence  corporate  decisions  and  the  access  of  different  enterprises  to
financial  resources  via  its  control  over  investable  funds.  These  potential
problems,  which  were  ignored  in the simulations  presented  in Table  4,  increase
exponentially  as pension  reserves  grow  and  become  a  large  share  of  the  total
capital  in the economy.
In  contrast  to  publicly  managed  funds,  privately  managed  pension  funds
fared  very  well  during  the  1980's,  because  they  were  insulated  from  political
control  and able  to take  full  advantage  of the high  yields  that  were  available
through  a  diversified  portfolio  of  bonds,  equities,  real  estate  and  foreign
assets. This empirical  experience,  and the behavior  that lies behind  it, suggests
that  competitive  decentralized  management  of funds  is likely  to earn  a higher
19return  for the pension  system  and for the economy  as a whole,  a major  reason  for
choosing  a multi-pillar  system  in which the funds are concentrated  in the private
pillar.  This  will  also  help  to  develop  financial  markets,  an  essential
prerequisite  for economic  growth  at  the  stage where  China  is now.  In order  to
achieve  these  benefits,  Singapore  and  Malaysia,  which  until  recently  featured
central  control  over  their  pension  funds,  are  now  decentralizing,  allowing
greater  diversification  of investments  and giving  workers  greater  control  over
the investment  strategy.
Besides the advantage  of competitive  management  of pension  reserves,  there
is also  an advantage  to having  part  of  the  pension  system  set up  as  defined
contribution  rather  than  defined  benefit.  The  hidden,  sometimes  perverse
redistributions  that  are inherent  in defined benefit  plans  are thereby  avoided.
The  close  link  between  benefits  and  contributions,  both  en  toto  and  at  the
margin,  means  that  workers  are more  likely  to regard  the required  contribution
as  their  own  saving,  rather  than  a  tax,  hence  it  is  less  likely  to  reduce
employment  or induce evasion. And the evasion that remains does not undermine  the
financial  viability  of the system,  as it would  in a PAYG  defined  benefit  plan.
This  paper  does  not  quantify  the  reduction  in evasion  but  it does  quantify  the
financial  improvement  for the system when the evading  individual  bears the cost.
In addition,  defined  contribution  plans  automatically  avoid  higher  costs
as longevity  increases,  without  the politically  difficult  decision  to raise  the
retirement  age periodically-  Instead,  either  the retirement  age shifts upward  or
the annual  benefit  shifts  downward  automatically  when  the worker's  accumulation
is  converted  into  an  annuity  upon  retirement,  as  life  expectancy  rises.
Similarly,  policy-makers  need not make  a universal  choice between wage  and price
indexation  as  real  wages  rise,  since  each  worker  can  choose  a  different  time
profile  of consumption.  Those who want  their living standards  to keep pace  with
wages will  have to forego withdrawals  at the beginning  of retirement  rather  than
placing  a financial  burden  on the over-all  system.  (See World  Bank  1994  for a
fuller  description  of and  rationale  for this  multi-pillar  system).
For  all these  reasons,  the uniform  contribution  rates  given  in Table  4--
which  are based  on a partial  equilibrium  model  with  many  variables  treated  as
exogenous  that  are in fact endogenous--underestimate  the real values  that would
be needed  in a single-pillar  partially  funded  defined  benefit  publicly  managed
20system. This paper explores  the situation  in which partial  funding is implemented
through a multi-pillar  system  in which the funded and unfunded  parts  (or pillars)
are separated,  each mandatory  and each having different  objectives  and managerial
arrangements.
The  unfunded  or tax-financed  pillar  provides  a defined  benefit,  has  the
object  of providing  a  social  safety  net,  and  is controlled  by  the government,
which has the power to redistribute.  Having a straightforward  poverty-prevention
goal,  this pillar  is more  likely  to achieve  it than under  current  single-pillar
systems,  where  poverty-alleviation  is but one of several  competing  goals,  many
kinds  of  redistributions  go on, and  they  are difficult  to observe  and measure
(see World  Bank  1994  for empirical  evidence  on the experience  of single-pillar
systems).
The funded part,  in contrast,  is privately  managed  and set up as a defined
contribution  plan.  The  investment  managers  may be chosen  by workers  (Chile and
Argentina) ,  employers  (Switzerland)  or joint union-employer  boards  (Australia).
Given  the absence  of independent  unions,  the fact  that many  employers  are state
enterprises,  and  the  importance  of  facilitating  labor  mobility,  the  former  is
probably  the  best  course  in  China  today.  This  pillar  is  ideally  suited  for
maximizing  the rate  of return  on peoples'  retirement  saving.
Specifically,  these  two pillars  take  the following  forms  in this paper:
1) a basic benefit  (  25% of the local average  wage)--designed  to keep  the
old  out  of  poverty,  and  financed  out  of  broad  payroll  or  general  tax
revenues  (Pillar I); and
2)  a  defined  contribution  (8.5%  of  wages)  that  goes  into  individual
accounts--fully  funded,  invested  competitively  by managers  who are chosen
by  the  workers  themselves,  and  eventually  turned  into  an  annuity  or
gradual  withdrawals  upon  the worker's  retirement  (Pillar II)  ."
One  of the biggest  risks of pension  reform  in China  is the probable  resistance
from  local  and  central  governments  toward  private  competitive  management  of
pension  funds--in  which  case  many  of the supposed  benefits  may be lost.
Risk  in the Single-Pillar  and Multi-Pillar  Systems
8  The  flat  benefit  might  be pro-rated  by years  of covered  service,  at the
rate  of,  say,  .6% per  year.  Prorating  would  not  change  the  results  of  these
simulations,  so long  as  the average  benefit  remained  25% of  the local  average
wage. The organization  and regulation  of the investment management  of the defined
contribution  pillar  are  discussed  generically  in World Bank  1994.
21Pillar  I, by definition,  provides  a basic benefit  that  is 25% of the local
average  wage  or  23%  of  the  final  wage  of  the  average  member  of  the  retiring
cohort.  Under  the real  wage growth  and interest  rate conditions  assumed  in this
paper,  Pillar  II will yield a 32% replacement  rate of final year's  salary  for an
individual  who  retires  after  45  years  of  contributions,  has  an  expected
retirement  duration  of 19 years,  and chooses  a price-indexed  annuity  (see Table
5). Thus,  under  these  conditions,  the  expected  pension  for the  average  worker
from  the  two  pillars  together,  in  the  long  run,  is  60%  of  the  economy-wide
average  wage  or 55% of final year  salary,  the same  as the reformed  replacement
rate  in the PAYG  system  analyzed  in Part  II.'
But  the variance  of  the benefit  in the multi-pillar  system  differs  from
that  of  the  defined  benefit  in  the  PAYG  system  in  at  least  two  important
respects.  First,  the provisicn  of a basic benefit  that  depends  on local average
wage  rather  than  the worker's  own wage means  that the replacement  rate  from the
first  pillar  varies  among  workers  from,  say,  46%  for  a  low  income  worker  who
earns half  the average  wage, to 11% for a high  income worker  who earns twice  the
average  wage,  and this means  that the total replacement  rate varies  from  78% to
43t.  Thus,  a worker  does  not know  ahead  of time  what  his  own  replacement  rate
will  be.  This  variance  in  the  replacement  rate  increases  uncertainty  in  one
respect,  but it simultaneously  reduces the risk of poverty  for low wage workers.
A basic benefit of this sort could be build into the defined benefit  formula,  but
often  it is not  and  the  non-transparency  of  the formula  makes  it difficult  to
calculate  the true  distributional  effects.
Second,  the interest  rate plays an important  role  in the funded  individual
accounts  that  it did  not play  in the PAYG  system--if  it falls  so too  will  the
replacement  rate  and  if it does  not exceed  the growth  rate  of wages  the system
is  unlikely  to  produce  an  acceptable  pension  benefit.  For  example,  if  the
financial  market  reform were delayed  so that the interest  rate after 2010 was 1%
instead  of  4%,  the  replacement  rate  for  the  average  worker  from  the  defined
' The  replacement  rate  would  be  less  for  a worker  who  enters  the  system
before  2010 because during  1996-2010  the interest rate is assumed  to be less than
the wage  growth  rate.  For instance,  a worker  who enters  in 1995  and retires  in
2040  only  gets  a 53% replacement  rate  and therefore  a  lower rate  of return.  If
the lower interest  rate continues  for longer,  so too would the lower replacement
rate.  This  is an  example  of  the  fact  that  both  the wage  growth  rate  and  the
interest  rate  determine  the pension  in a defined  contribution  account,  and  the
worker  is therefore  subject  to interest  rate  risk.
22contribution  pillar  would  be 13%  instead  of 32%. To bring  the replacement  rate
back  to 32%  would  require  a contribution  rate  to Pillar  II of  20%  instead  of
8.5%.  Interest  rate  risk  is  inherent  in  funded  defined  contribution  systems,
underscoring  the importance  of using financial  institutions  and instruments  that
produce  high  returns.
In  a  pure  funded  defined  contribution  plan,  the  worker  is  subject  to
capital  market  volatility  and in a pure  PAYG defined  benefit  plan  the worker  is
subject to political  risk--the  possibility  that  the government  will be unable  to
keep  its pension  promises.  Compared  with  a single-pillar  plan,  the multi-pillar
system  has  the  advantage  of diversification  and  consequent  risk  minimization,
since  the  total pension  depends  on a combination  of sources--partly  on payroll
taxes  and partly  on income  from  capital,  partly  on private  sector  capacity  and
partly  on public  sector credibility,  partly on domestic economic  developments  and
partly  on the broader  international  situation  (through  investments  abroad).  If
one basket  breaks,  hopefully  some  eggs  will  still  be left  in the other  basket.
The Cost  of the Multi-Pillar  System,  And How  to Finance  the Transition
Although  a  shift  from  the  current  PAYG  defined  benefit  system  to  a
partially  funded multi-pillar  system may be desirable  for all  the reasons  given
above,  it involves  transition  costs,  because  the old pension  debt  must  be paid
off  (i.e. existing  pensioners  and new  retirees  must  continue  to  receive  their
benefits),  while  at the  same  time workers  are  contributing  enough  to build  up
their  own  individual  accounts.  The  payments  to  existing  pensioners  can  be
financed  by payroll,  income  or consumption  taxes,  by cuts  in other  government
expenditures,  by proceeds  from the assets  of privatized  state enterprises,  or by
borrowing.  How these transition  costs are covered determines  the time pattern  of
required  contribution  rates under  the new system,  as well  as its efficiency  and
equity  effects.
The  "double"  costs  that appear  to be involved  during  the transition  have
been  a major  stumbling  block to reform  in many  countries--they  appear  to impose
a huge tax burden  (or service cut) on the current generation  of workers.  However,
this  concentrated  double  cost  for the  transition  generation  turns  out  to be an
illusion,  since the possibility  exists  of borrowing  and spreading  the burden  of
repayment  over  several  generations,  at a low cost  to each.  In this  section  we
23compare  the costs  of the new  system,  including  the transition,  with  and without
borrowing,  under  the assumptions  that:
*In 1995, China shifted  to the multi-pillar  system  just described,  i.e. new
entrants  to  the  covered  labor  force  simply  receive  the  basic  benefit  and  the
annuity  from  their  own accounts.
*The pay-off  of the pension  debt is financed through  a transition  account.
Current  pensioners  continue  receiving  their  stated  benefits  and  "middlemen,"
i.e.,  current  workers,  will  receive  a compensatory  annuity  that  is 1% of their
final year's  salary  for each  year  of service  under  the old  system  (in addition
to the basic  benefit  and an annuity  from their  individual  accounts).
*To reduce program costs,  retirement  age will gradually  be raised  to 65 and
price  indexation  will  be used,  as in the reform  scenarios  discussed  in part  II.
*In the baseline  scenario  coverage  does not expand  but in later  scenarios
it does.
Transition  costs paid by present worker  cohorts.  In this scenario  there is
no borrowing  and no coverage  expansion.  Instead,  current  workers  pay  the costs
of the new  system  (which includes  their own prefunded  accounts)  and also  cover
the obligations  to pensioners  and middlemen  under  the old  system  (Table 6, row
1)  . The latter  requires  a payroll  tax of 20% initially,  but this declines  to 3%
by 2030  and 1% by 2050 because most  of the middlemen  have died  and the remaining
few  get  compensation  for only  a  small  number  of  years  under  the  old  system.
Comparing  the total  cost  of this reformed  multi-pillar  system  with  a continued
but  reformed  PAYG  system  (Table  3,  row  9),  we  see  that  initially  required
contribution  rates are 8.5 percentage  points higher under the multi-pillar  system
than  under  PAYG--but  by  2100  the  former  is 7.5 percentage  points  lower.  While
payroll  taxes rise through time under PAYG, they fall under a multi-pillar  system
if the current  generation  finances  the transition.  Neither  model  provides  tax
smoothing  over time.  Nor is the high  initial rate under prefunding  likely  to be
economically  desirable  or politically  acceptable.
Transition  costs  spread  over  many  generations  through  borrowing.
Alternatively,  a uniform  contribution  rate  over  time  can be charged  that  will
just  cover  the  debt  of the  old  system  as well  as the  costs  of the  new  system
until 2100  (Table 7)  . Without  extended  coverage,  this rate turns out to be almost
20W.  This  can be decomposed  into 1) a 3.7% payroll  tax that pays  off the pension
24debt,  2) an 7.5%  payroll  tax that  equates  the present  value  of revenues  to the
present  value  of expenditures  for the basic benefit  (Pillar I), and  3) an 8.5%
defined  contribution  to the individual  accounts  in Pillar  II.
Initially  transitional  expenditures  are much greater than  the 3.  7% uniform
payroll  tax so money  must  be borrowed  to cover  some of the payouts  to existing
pensioners.  But  transiticr. costs  disappear  shortly  after  2050  as payments  to
middlemen  decline,  and the loans are fully repaid by 2100, out of the continuing
payroll  tax.  Thus, the combined uniform  rate  (with borrowing)  is lower than  the
year-to-year  rate on row 1 (no  borrowing)  at first, but slightly  higher  later on.
The  loans  to the transition  account  would  come  first  from  the surplus  in
Pillar  I and second  from the financial  markets more broadly.  One possible  source
of  loans  is Pillar  II,  which  would  make  the  pension  system  as  a  whole  self-
sustaining.  While  Pillar  II remains  autonomous  and  competitive,  so  it  is not
required  to  lend  for  this  purpose,  lending  to  the  government  to  finance  the
transition  is a logical investment  strategy  at the start given the limited number
of  financial  instruments  available.  These  loans  would  be  explicit,  with  a
specified  redemption  date  and  a  positive  market  interest  rate  (unlike  the
notional  individual  accounts  discussed  in the Appendix).  They could be guaranteed
by  the  government  and/or  collateralized  by  future  earmarked  payroll  taxes  or
proceeds  from SOE assets  (see  below) . A plan for repaying  the loans  is important
if part  of the object  of the pension  reform  is to increase  national  saving.  This
financing  method,  based  on borrowing  and  eventual  repayment,  implies  that  the
burden  of the  transition  is spread  over  105 years  of cohorts,  instead  of being
borne  heavily  by  the first  30 years  of cohorts.
Extended  coverage  and broader  pooling.  The temporary  gains  from  coverage
expansion  to the nonstate  sector  in urban and rural areas can ideally be used  to
finance  the  transition  to  a  partially  funded  system,  whose  costs  are  also
temporary.  If  we  expand  coverage,  the  constant  contribution  rate  needed  to
finance  the new system plus  the transition  falls to 17.4%  (Table 7, row 4)  . This
again can be decomposed  into three parts:  1.6 percentage  points needed  to pay off
the pension  debt  (the transition  account),  7.3 percentage  points  used to pay  the
on-going  costs of the basic benefit  CPillar I), and 8.5 percentage  points  for the
25individual  accounts (Pillar  II).  (Alternatively,  the pension debt can be paid
off by 2050 with a 2.8% contribution  rate)."
The gains from coverage expansion are concentrated in the first three
decades,  exactly  when the transition  costs  are at their  highest (Figure  5)  . The
contributions  of newly  covered  workers  to  Pillar  I  in  effect  are  used  as  a timely
loan to the  transition  account in  the early  years  when it is  running  a deficit,
and the repayment of the loan when it has a surplus is used to cover their
benefits from Pillar I later on (Table  8, row 4). This reduces the loans that
would be required from  elsewhere in the economy.
Without coverage extension the transition account plus Pillar I,
combined,  run  a large  debt  until  2050  and  the  balance  does  not become  zero  until
2100 even though a  higher contribution  rate is charged (Table  8, rows 2 and 3).
The  debt  must  be covered  by continued  borrowing  from  Pillar  II  or other  lenders,
thereby using  up  financial resources that  could be  invested productively
elsewhere.  In  contrast,  when  coverage  is  expanded  the  larger  base  of  contributors
augments  revenues  long  before it  increases  expenditures  of Pillar  I,  so that  the
combined debt is eliminated  by 2015 and becomes small  even earlier (rows  5 and
6)  . Thus, the  entire  balance  in  Pillar  II can  be  used to increase  the  productive
capacity  of the  economy.  And this  balance in  Pillar  II  becomes  mauch larger  with
increased coverage.
To achieve  these financial  gains  from  coverage  expansion,  it  must  go hand-
in-hand with broader pooling for paying the transitional costs and the basic
benefit, to ensure that the newly covered  groups are not in their  own separate
pools. (Pillar  II,  in  contrast,  should  remain  decentralized  and competitive)  . For
example, pooling might take place at the provincial rather than the municipal
level. The current system of local pooling is due in part to administrative
factors  such as  the  localization  of tax  collection  facilities  and the  payment  of
benefits in cash (since  checks do not exist and electronic transfers  are only
just beginning in China). From the  viewpoint  of economic  efficiency,  one would
'°  If a decision is  made to pay off the  pension  debt  by 2050  and to balance
the system  separately  for  the periods  before  and  after 2050, this  would  require
a 17% contribution rate before 2050 (3% for the transition account, 5.5% for
Pillar  I  and 8.5%  for  Pillar  II)  and 19% (10.5%  for  Pillar  I,  8.5%  for  Pillar  II)
after.  The higher cost of the  basic benefit in the latter  period due to system
maturation  and  the  increased  dependency  rate  offsets  the  concentrated  transition
cost in the first  period, so the  contribution  rate turns  out to be very similar
for the two periods.
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scope, as the benefit-disbursement,  tax-collecting  and record-keeping  capacities
of  the provinces  and  the central  government  improve.  Besides  facilitating  the
financing  of the system,  this will also maximize  economies  of scale from broader
risk-sharing  and  computerized  administration.  But  the  process  of  centralizing
Pillar  I  may  be  delayed  by  political  considerations,  including  the  limited
capacity  of  the  provinces  and  central  government  to  secure  compliance  from
localities  that wish  to control the reserves  and those with  low dependency  ratios
who  will  lose  if forced  into a common  pool.
Aside  from the financial  advantage  to the pension  system  and the economy,
the newly covered groups also benefit by receiving  protection  when they grow old,
if the  family  support  system  has broken  down  in the interim.  But  the danger  of
covering  these  new  enterprises  is that  they  may  resist  by evading  and  if they
don't  evade  their labor costs  will rise, partially  choking  off their growth.  If
the  contribution  rate  is  kept  low,  and  in a  form  that  is closely  linked  to
benefits  so that workers  consider  it their own savings  rather  than a tax  (as in
a  multi-pillar  system  with  a  defined  contribution  component),  this  negative
effect  will  be minimized.
Comparisons  among alternative  systems.  In summary,  Figure  6 contrasts  the
stream  of break-even  contribution  rates that would be required  under  the current
PAYG  system,  the  reformed  PAYG,  and  the  reformed  multi-pillar  system  with
coverage  expansion  but  without  initial  borrowing  (lines 1, 2 and 3). The  first
is obviously  much higher  than the last two, demonstrating  that the design  changes
are essential  whether  or not the transition  is made to a multi-pillar  system. The
second  is lowest  at  first because  it does  not  incur  transition  costs  and  the
third  is lowest  at the end because  it is partially  funded.
Figure  6 also  contrasts  the uniform  contribution  rates  under  a partially
funded defined benefit  versus a multi-pillar  system with the transition  financed
through  borrowing  (lines  4  and  5).  One  might  expect  the  required  rate  to be
higher  in the multi-pillar,  which ends up with a large stock of capital,  whereas
funds in the single-pillar  system are depleted by the end. Nevertheless,  it turns
out  that  the contribution  rate  is one  percentage  point  lower  under  the multi-
pillar  system.
27How  can  this  be?  The main  explanation  appears  to be the  high  (25%) non-
compliance  rate, which  makes  the effective  tax rate  much  lower  than it appears,
for both  systems.  When  a 20%  tax rate  is imposed,  only  15% of the wage  bill  is
collected.  Under the single pillar  system as well as Pillar I in the multi-pillar
system,  people  who  evade  or underreport  their  income  often  manage  to collect
benefits,  thereby using up resources  that they never contributed.  However,  in the
defined contribution  component  the evader pays the price--he  simply does not have
an account  or an annuity  from  it at the end. Evasion  costs are not passed  on to
others, nor do they undermine  the financial  sustainability  of the system. Because
contributors  are not forced  to subsidize  evaders,  the 8.5% defined  contribution
rate provides  a benefit  to them  that would  have  cost much  more  in the  defined
benefit  system  and  leaves  enough  left over  to build a large reserve  fund at the
same time.  Part of these retirement  savings may simply crowd out other voluntary
saving  but part  are a net  increment  to national  saving,  particularly  long  term
saving,  and  as  such  augment  the  country's  capital  stock  and  GNP.  The
accumulation  of these  large  reserves  means  investment  income  is generated  that
keeps  payroll  taxes low even  beyond  2100, while  in the partially  funded  defined
benefit  system  the reserves  are  depleted  by 2050  or  2100  and  the  contribution
rate  will  have  to rise  sharply.
In  reality,  the  cost  advantage  of  the  multi-pillar  system  over  the
partially  funded  defined  benefit  scheme  is likely  to be higher  yet,  when  the
feedback  effects  on economic  growth  from  the  superior  allocation  of  capital,
financial  market  development,  reduced escape of labor to the informal  sector, and
the  tendency  toward  later  retirement--that  were  not  quantified  in the present
analysis--are  taken  into account.
Use  of SOE assets.  Proceeds  from the sale of state owned  enterprise  (SOE)
assets  are an additional  potential  funding  source  for the transition--in  China
and in other  countries  as well.  SOE's and their municipalities  have  substantial
assets  in the form of plants, equipment,  housing and land use rights,  in addition
to pension  and other  liabilities.  It is tempting  to use  their  assets  to offset
their  pension  debt.  This  could  be  accomplished  through  a  direct  transfer  of
assets  or proceeds  from the assets when they are sold, or indirectly  by imposing
a capital  gains  tax on asset  sales,  especially  housing  and  land  use sales,  and
utilizing  the  revenues  to  finance  the  transition.  If capital  gains  that  are
28realized  over  the  next  two  decades  represent  a windfall  that  is due  to rapid
changes  in the Chinese  economy  rather  than  to calculated  investment  decisions,
a modest  tax on these gains may be less distortionary  and more  equitable  than an
incremental  payroll  tax.
In the most  optimistic  scenario  the assets  would  be used  to pay  off  the
whole  pension  debt.  The transitional  account  would  borrow  initially,  but these
loans would be fully repaid  and replaced  by proceeds  from  the SOE assets  as they
become  available.  This  strategy,  if feasible,  would  reduce  the long-run  break-
even  contribution  rate  by 1.5 percentage  points,  to a total of  16.5%.
More  modestly,  the  assets  could  repay part  of the pension  debt  or enable
the loans to be repaid  faster,  so that lower contribution  rates  could gradually
be phased  in.  The assets  could also be used as collateral  for the loans, thereby
making  the  loans  more  attractive.  Some  localities  in China  are  already  using
these  assets  in a minor  way  to help  cover  their pension  expenses.  For  example,
in Luoyuan  county,  Fujian  province,  land-use  transactions  are  taxed  for  this
purpose.  Although  rules  regarding  bankruptcy  are not yet completely  clear,  they
are moving  toward  a situation  in which  payment  of the pension  debt  will  have  a
high  claim  on the assets  of bankrupt  firms.
In the aggregate  and in the long  run the value of SOE assets  far exceeds
the pension debt  in China. However,  many  institutional  and political  impediments
make  it difficult  to count  on  using  these  assets  for a  direct  pay-off  of the
pension  debt. Among  these obstacles  are the ambiguous  ownership  rights  over  SOE
assets  (are the owners  the SOE's, the municipalities  or the state?)  the fact that
ownership  of assets  and liabilities  may  not coincide,  and  the wide variance  in
value  and  accessibility  of SOE  assets  across  municipalities.  Ironically,  the
more  SOE's  are encouraged  to behave  as self-sustaining  enterprises  rather  than
as arms  of the state,  the less  willing  those  with  substantial  good  assets  will
become  to give  them  away  to bail  out  those  with  few assets  and  a  large  debt.
Other  difficulties  stem  from  the  absence  of  well  developed  real  estate  and
mortgage  markets,  the reluctance  of long-time  tenants  to move  or to pay market
rents,  the possibility  that  the needs  of pension  policy  and housing  policy  may
conflict,  and  the great  uncertainty  that  surrounds  the  time  at which  proceeds
from  SOE  assets  will  become  available.
29If SOE's  sell  their housing  and other  assets,  from  an economic  viewpoint
the proceeds  should  be used  in a way  that maximizes  the return.  In some  cases,
a pay-off  of  the  pension  debt  may  satisfy  this  criterion,  but  in other  cases
SOE's  may  be  better  off  financing  the  pension  transition  through  a stream  of
payroll  taxes, while investing  the proceeds  from their assets  elsewhere  (e.g. in
up-to-date  equipment),  to  enhance  their  productive  capabilities.  This  is
especially  the  case  in  a  situation  where  borrowing  facilities  are  limited.
Moreover,  it  is possible  that  privatization  of SOE's  will  take  place  through
corporatizing  them  (issuing stock) or by converting  them into joint ventures  with
foreign  firms.  In  that  case,  the  assets  would  remain  with  the  new  privatized
enterprise  rather than being sold and liquid  funds would not be generated  to pay
the pension  debt. Taxing housing  sales, land use transactions  and stock  sales of
corporatized  enterprises  might  still work--so  long  as the  tax rate  is kept  low
to avoid  impeding  the  development  of real  estate  and  equity  markets.
These  various  obstacles  have  proved  insuperable  in some  Eastern  European
countries,  but  others  (e.g. Hungary  and Poland)  are  indeed  using  SOE assets  to
cover  the deficits  of or partially  fund  their old pension  systems,  and  Bolivia
is using  them  to  fully  fund  its  new  pension  systems.  In China,  applying  SOE
assets  to help pay off the pension  debt, directly or indirectly  through a capital
gains  tax,  remains  a promising  possibility  that should  be explored--so  long  as
pension  reform  is not  made  contingent  on this  possibility.  As part  of such  a
plan  it is essential  to identify  a default source  of revenue  in case the revenue
from SOE assets  does not materialize  in a timely manner. As noted above,  a small
payroll  tax is one  such  default  option.
IV. Conclusions  and  Risks
As  one  of  the  most  rapidly  aging  countries  in  the  world,  China  is
evaluating  how  to  reform  its  old  age  support  system  so  that  it  provides
protection  to the old and does not impede rapid economic growth.  The current PAYG
defined benefit system will not achieve either goal. It will produce  contribution
rates  of  40%  by  2030  and  over  50%  by  2050,  the  uneven  tax  rates  across
municipalities  and enterprises  interferes with efficient resource  allocation,  the
fragmentation  and  lack  of funding  of the  scheme  impede  labor  mobility,  later
30generations  of old  and  young  will  lose  real  income,  and  the  vast  majority  of
workers  are not covered at all. Chinese authorities  recognize  these problems  and
are  experimenting  with  alternative  reforms.
This  paper  has  analyzed  the  impact  of design  options  such  as  decreased
replacement  rates,  increased  retirement  ages and a  move  toward price rather  than
wage indexation,  as well as more basic changes such as a shift toward a partially
funded  multi-pillar  system.  We conclude  that:
*The  design  reforms described  above are an essential  first step and reduce
costs substantially;  however,  steeply rising  contribution  rates,  inducements  to
evade  and  intergenerational  transfers  remain  under  PAYG.
*The  shift  to a  partially  funded  system  would  cut  these  tax  swings  and
intergenerational  transfers  and would help to build up a large stock of long term
saving.
OBased  on the experience  of other  countries,  private  management  of these
funds  seems  most  likely  to maximize  their  rate  of  return  and  a  multi-pillar
system  that  includes  a  funded privately  managed  defined  contribution  pillar  to
manage  peoples'  savings  plus  a PAYG publicly  managed  defined  benefit  pillar  to
provide  a social  safety  net seems most  likely  to achieve  the redistributive  and
replacement  rate objectives  at minimum  costs,  and with greatest  diversification
of risk.
*A  system  that  includes  a  defined  contribution  component  achieves
substantial  financial  savings  compared  with  the single  pillar  system, by making
the evader bear the cost in terms of foregone benefits.  But the biggest advantage
of the multi-pillar  approach  may be its feedback effects  on economic  growth--by
reducing  escape  to the  informal  sector  and  early  retirement  and  by increasing
long  term  saving  and  financial  market  development--which,  have  not  been
quantified  in this  study.
*The  transition  to  such  a  system  can  be  accomplished  with  a  long  term
contribution  rate of under 18%, considerably  less than that imposed today in most
Chinese  cities. Of this total,  1.6 percentage  points  would be used to pay off the
old pension  debt,  7.3 percentage  points  would  finance the basic  benefit  and 8.5
percentage  points  would  go into  the  individual  accounts.  Such  a time-invariant
contribution  rate  implies  borrowing  initially  to  cover  deficits,  as  current
pensioners  are  paid  while  reserves  build  up,  and  repaying  these  loans  with
31surplus  revenues  later on. The costs of paying  the pension  debt are  thus shared
by several generations.  Some of the loans could be made by the funded  pillar  as
a part  of its investment  portfolio  in the early  years  of the new  system.
*Proceeds  or taxes from the sale of SOE assets  are another possible  source
for financing  the transition.  This  could cut the long run tax burden  by up to 1.6
percentage  points.
*The large potential  for expanding  coverage  together with  broader pooling,
is partially  responsible  for these affordable  costs.  The pay-off  of the pension
debt  is also  facilitated  by China's  high  wage  growth  rate,  combined  with  price
rather  than wage  indexation  of benefits,  since  this  expands  the tax base  while
constraining  the rise  in expenditures.  If China's  wage  rates  followed  the  slow
growth  scenario,  as in OECD  countries  today,  the requisite  uniform  contribution
rate  would  rise  3 percentage  points.  China  is in a position  to convert  these
short  term opportunities  into long  term gains--an  improved,  sustainable  pension
system.
One  risk  of  this  scheme  is  that  bringing  the  nonstate  sector  into  the
system might choke off its rapid growth  rate, which has been good  for the economy
as  a  whole.  Minimizing  or  counteracting  this  risk  is  the  fact  that  expanded
coverage  could be phased  in gradually  over  a period  of years,  the contribution
rate  would  be  considerably  below  current  levels,  much  of  it  would  go  into
workers'  own  defined  contribution  accounts  which  might  be  less  distortionary
since  intra-  and  inter-generational  redistributions  are  not  involved,  and
including  all enterprises  creates  a level playing  field which in itself enhances
efficiency.
A  second  risk  is the possibility  that  many  enterprises,  especially  those
in  the  nonstate  sector,  might  try  to  evade  contributing,  and  that  local
authorities  might  not  cooperate  fully  in  enforcing  compliance.  Because  these
policies  involve  extension  of coverage  to groups  that are not  now in the system
and they alter  the pattern  of costs and benefits  among those  in the system,  some
people  may  regard  themselves  as winners  and some  as losers  from  the  change.  In
principle  it should  be possible  to make most groups  better  off if there are true
efficiency  gains.  Some  of the gains  are: an impediment  to continued  high  growth
rates will be removed; all workers will get more secure pensions  in the long run;
previously  covered  groups  will  benefit  from  lower  contribution  rates  and
32especially  from lower rates than they would have had to pay  in the future; newly
covered  workers will benefit  from pensions  when  they retire, thereby  heading  off
potentially  serious  social  problems;  newly  covered  employers  might  pay  their
share of the contribution  rate  in lieu of wage  increases--particularly  feasible
in a context  where  wages  are rising  rapidly;  and workers  and/or  municipalities
will  get greater  discretion  regarding  the investment  of funds  in the individual
accounts.  Nevertheless,  non-compliance  may be high  because  most benefits  accrue
in the future  and are inherently  uncertain,  while  substantial  costs,  especially
for newly  covered  groups,  are  incurred  in the present.  Therefore,  improved  tax
administration  and  a major  public  relations  effort  are needed  to convince  most
groups  that  they  will  indeed  be better  off covered  and should  comply.
A  third  risk  stems  from  resistance  from  local  authorities--currently
municipal  and later on provincial--who  may wish to perpetuate  their control over
the pooled  reserves.  The more  entrenched  they become,  the more  difficult  it may
be  to  overcome  this  institutional  resistance  and  eventually  move  toward  a
national  system, when  this is justified  on efficiency  grounds.  Thus a system  that
is meant  to be temporary  could  take on a life of its own and become  permanent,
as  a  result  of  institutional  interests  that  develop  during  a  policy  of
gradualism.  A  carrot  that  can be used  to overcome  this  resistance  is the  fact
that  broader  pools  with  newly  covered  enterprises  will  reduce  the  required
contribution  rate  in most  cities  with  older  plans  and  pensioners.  This  is  a
political  argument  for  moving  quickly  toward  a  national  pool,  while  coverage
expands.
The  biggest  risk  is the possibility  that  the Chinese  government  will  be
unwilling  to relinquish  public  control  over  the allocation  of pension  funds  or
to pay  an interest  rate  that  correctly  reflects  the high  marginal  productivity
of  capital  in  China  today.  Under  the  current  circumstances,  with  local
government  control,  heavy  required  investment  in central  government  bonds  at
negative  real  interest  rates,  few  alternative  financial  instruments  and  very
limited mobility  of capital within  the country,  the accumulated  pension  funds are
declining  rather  than  increasing  in value.  They  are not being  allocated  to the
highest productivity  uses nor will they provide a reasonable  replacement  rate for
workers  upon  retirement.  If  China  implements  a partially  funded  multi-pillar
pension  system,  it  must  go  hand-in-hand  with  financial  sector  reform  and
33restructured investment  procedures that  emphasize  the "right"  mix  of competition,
diversification and regulation, or the pension reform will ultimately fail.
34Appendix:  Notional defined contribution plans
In the  past, defined contribution  plans were fully  funded, since  money was
put into the accounts and invested, interest  was earned, and pensions were paid
only  to  the extent  that they were  covered by  these assets. More  recently,
however, several countries, including Sweden, Italy, Latvia and some cities in
China, have begun experimenting with notional defined contribution accounts.
The basic idea  behind a notional account is that a worker's account is set
up  as a  book-keeping device, to  keep track  of  contributions  plus imputed  interest
at a rate determined by the government, but funds are  never accumulated in these
accounts. Instead,  the  money is  used to  pay current  benefits and the  accounts are
notional or empty  accounts. When the  worker reaches retirement  age, the  notional
accumulation  in his  or her  account  is converted into an annuity  (its size
depending on the expected duration of retirement and the interest  rate) and paid
to the  retiree out of  contributions that  younger  workers are  making at that time,
as they build up their own notional accounts.
A notional defined contribution  plan  has certain advantages  over a defined
benefit plan.  It  produces a  close transparent  relationship  between  contributions
and benefits, thereby deterring evasion and other distortionary behavior. It
eliminates some undesirable redistributions within the same cohort, since all
individuals receive the same notional interest rate. It automatically adjusts
retirement  age up  or benefits  down as expected lifetimes  increase, thereby
preventing pension costs from rising as fast as they would otherwise.
However, so  long  as the  accounts  remain  notional,  the  system is  essentially
PAYG. It will not increase long term national saving. Like all PAYG systems, it
will  produce  sharp  rises  in  required  contribution  rates  and  large  inter-
generational transfers as populations age.  And because the interest rate paid
into the accounts is largely notional rather than determined by actual returns,
it is  highly subject to  political  manipulation. For  example, it  may be lower than
the  market rate, implying  that  workers  are not  getting  back the full  market  value
of their  contributions,  which  are  thereby  being  diverted  to  cross-subsidize  other
government activities.  Or it could  be higher than the  market rate, implying that
35future generations may face a heavier tax burden than expected in the future to
pay these obligations.
In a  partially funded,  partially notional system,  a reserve is accumulated
to partially back up these accounts. It is  possible for the funded part of each
account to  be managed in a  decentralized way--for example, workers or unions and
employers could choose the investment manager, who is then given considerable
control over the investment strategy. However, because the reserves are only a
small part of each account, their management and investment strategy are more
likely to be centralized, leading to the capital misallocation and low yield
problems discussed in the  text.  Finally,  since the  accounts  are largely  notional
from the  start, they may never  become  largely funded even  if contributions
substantially exceed expenditures at some  future  point. Instead  of regarding the
use of funds in the early years as a loan which must be repaid later on when
revenues exceed expenditures, governments may simply use any later surplus as
part of their  general finance.  For  all these reasons,  partially funded notional
accounts may quickly degenerate into empty notional accounts, which in turn are
very much like unfunded PAYG systems.
The multi-pillar system is less  susceptible to these dangers  because it is
more likely to be competitively managed with diversified portfolios and with
lending  to  the  government  at  a  market-determined  rate,  with  an  explicit
obligation to repay.
36Table 1. Population Aging in China
1995  2000  2030  2050  2100
Proportion  of population  over  9  10  22  26  30
age  60
Demographic  dependency  ratea  17  18  43  53  63
System  dependency  rateb  21  24  42  55  71
Reformed  system  dependency  ratec  21  15  25  33  46
Average  age  of population  30  31  38  40  42
Expected  duration  of retirement  19  20  23  25  26V
with  current  retirement  age
Expected  duration  retirement-if  19  19  19  19  19C
retirement  age  increases
% Workers  who  are  urban-if  no  26  26  25  25  24
urban  in-migrationd
i  Workers  who  are  urban-with  26  28  39  46  49
urban  in-migration'
% Workers  who  are urban+TVE  47  54  82  84  85
(rural  industry)
Source:  World  Bank  Population  projections  and  simulations  by
authors.
a  Population  over  age  60/ population  aged  20-59
b  Pensioners/covered  workers,  based  on  simulations  with
unchanged  retirement  age,  rural/urban  division  and  coverage
Pensioners/covered  workers,  based  on simulations  with
increased  retirement  age,  rural/urban  migration  and  expanded
coverage.  See  Table  2 for rate  of increase  in retirement
age,  rate  of urban  in-migration  and  coverage  expansion
assumed.
d  By  "urban"  is meant  existing  cities.  As population  and
industry  grows  in "rural"  areas  they  too will  become
"urbanized",  but  they  are not  considered  "urban"  in this
table.
e  These  numbers  apply  to 2065,  not  2100
37Table  2. Baseline  and Alternative  Assumptions
1995-  2011-  2051-
2010  2050  2100
Real  wage  growth-baselinea  5.5%  3.0  3.0%
Slow  growth  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%
Real  interest  rate-baseline  0.0%  4.0%  4.0%
Past  reform  3.0%  4.0%  4.0%
Slow  reform  and  slow  growth  0  1.0  1.0
Noncompliance  + exemption  rate  25%  25%  25%
Benefit  rate  (average  pension/ave.  age)
baseline  80t  80%  80%
Reform  60%  60%  609
Replacement  rate  of  final  year  wage
baseline  73%  73%  73t
Reform  55%  55%  55%
Retiremeint age  - M  60  60  60
- F  55  55  55
Reform  (at end  of period)  - M  60  65  65
- F  60  65  65
Rate  of  increase  per  year  in  4 months  2  2
reform  months  months
Indexation  to real  wage-baseline  50%  50%  50%
Reform  (price  indexation)  0  0  0
Coverage  rate  - urban  72W  72%  72%
Increased  urbanization-baseline  0  0  0
In-migration  rate  b  1.5%  1.0%  0
TVE  + private  share  of rural  labor  28%  50%  70%
(at beginning  of period)
TVE  +  rural  private  coverage  0  0  0
Alternative-at  beginning  of periodc  30%  54%  80%
Increase  per  year  in TVE  labor  share  &  1.5%  1.5%  0
coverage  rate  (percentage  points)
Ratio--rural  to urban  wage  70%  70%  70%
In addition  to this rate of economy-wide  wage growth,  which  applies
to all  cohorts,  workers  are  assumed  to receive  a 1% per  year  wage
increase  for  experience  during  their  first  thirty  years  of
employment.  This generally  does not affect  the average  wage  growth
in the economy  or the ratio of average  pension  to average  wage  (the
benefit  rate)  but  it does  affect  ratio  of pension  to final  year's
wage  for  the  average  retiree  (the replacement  rate).
Only  applies  to population  under  age 35. Gives  % increase  in urban
share of total population  in each group  under  35.  (eg. if the urban
share  was  30%  in 1995  it becomes  30.45%  in 1996)
Covered  TVE workers  are eligible  for pensions  beginning  with  those
who  retire  in 2011.
38Table  3. Break  Even  Contribution  Rates  for Reformed  PAYG  Defined  Benefit  System
(percentage  of wage  bill)
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2050  2100
(1)  Current  system  --  baselinea  20  22  21  27  37  49  60
(2)  Current  system  - slow  growth  20  23  25  30  40  54  68
(3)  Reduced  replacement  ratio  20  20  17  21  28  36  45
(4)  Increased  retirement  age'  20  21  20  24  29  33  42
(5)  Price  indexation  20  19  17  23  32  42  50
(6)  Price  indexation  - slow  growth  20  22  24  29  38  50  63
(7)  Rapid  interest  rate  reform  20  22  21  27  37  49  60
(8)  Delegated  interest  rate  reform  20  22  21  27  37  49  60
(9)  Combined  reforms'  20  17  13  15  19  21  27
(10) Combined  reforms  with  coverage  20  12  7  12  16  20  26
expansion
a  Current  system means 80%  replacement  rate;  retirement age 55 for women, 60
for men;  50%  real  wage  indexation.  See Table  2  for baseline  and  reform
assumptions.
b  Retirement  age for women raised  to 60 by  2010.  Retirement  age for men and
women  raised  to 65 by  2040.
Combined reforms mean 60% replacement rate, retirement age raised to 65 for
men and women by 2040, price indexation, rapid interest rate reform.
d  See Table 2 for increased rate of migration to urban areas and coverage
expansion in rural areas.
39Table 4. Uniform Contribution Rates for Partially Funded
Defined Benefit System
(percentage  of wage bill)
1995-2100  1995-2050  2051-2100
(1)  Current system --  baselinea  41.1  32.1  54.7
(2)  Current system - slow growth  48.7  36.0  61.6
(3)  Reduced replacement ratio  31.3  24.9  41.0
(4)  Increased retirement ageb  30.5  26.0  37.3
(5)  Price indexation  34.9  27.5  46.3
(6)  Price indexation - slow growth  45.8  34.3  57.5
(7)  Rapid interest rate reforms  40.5  31.6  54.7
(8)  Delegated interest rate reform  50.6  35.9  56.0
(9)  Combined reform  19.8  17.2  23.8
(10)  Combined reforms with coverage  18.3  14.6  23.1
*  Column 1  gives uniform contribution rate  through time that  will equate the
present value of revenues and expenditures from 1995-2100.  Columns 2 and
3  give the  uniform contribution rates for  1995-2050  and 2051-2100 if the
system is  balanced separately for these  two period.  See Table 3 for other
definitions.
40Table 5. Replacement Rates Under Multi-Pillar System for
19 Years of Expected Retirement
Year of  No. years  No. years  Transitional  D C  Total
Retirement  work  work  +Basic  Pension"  Replacement
Old Systema  New Systema  Benefitb  Rate
2000  37  5  60  3  63
2020  19  25  42  15  57
2030  10  35  33  22  55
2040  0  45  23  30  53
2050  0  45  23  32  55
2060-2100  0  45  23  32  55
a  Expected working period increases as retirement age increases, but
this is partially offset by schooling increase.
b  This gives replacement rate of final year's wage for average member of
retiring cohort.  Formulas for transitional and basic benefits are
given in text. Pension from DC individual accounts is based on
baseline wage growth and interest rate assumptions in Table 2.
Retirement age is reformed option in Table 2.
Expected period of retirement is 19 throughout.  Increased longevity
is offset by increased retirement age.
Price indexation of pension is assumed.
Contribution rate to DC pension is 8.5%, of which .3W  goes toward
administrative expenses.
For contribution rates to transitional +  basic benefit seet Table 6.
41Table  6. Annual  Contribution  Rate  needed  for Multi-Pillar  System,  Including
Transition  Costs
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2050  2100
No ExDanded  Coverage
(1) Total  (incl.  8.5%  D.C.)  28.5  25.5  20.5  19.5  19.5  17.5  19.5
(2) Transition  cost  20  15  8  5  3  1  0
(3) Basic  Benefit  0  2  4  6  8  8  11
Exianded  Coverage
(4) Total  (incl.  D.C)  28.5  20.5  15.5  15.5  16.5  16.5  19.5
(5) Transition  cost  20  10  4  3  2  0  0
(6) Basic  Benefit  0  2  3  4  6  8  11
This  table  assumes  that  the  8.5%  DC contribution  began  in 1995.
42Table 7. Uniform Contribution Rate needed for Multi-Pillar System,
With Borrowing to cover Transition Costs
1995-2100  1995-2050  2051-2100
No Expanded Coverage
(1)  Total  (incl.  8.5% D.C.)  19.7  20.4  18.5
(2)  Transition cost  3.7  6.0  0
(3)  Basic Benefit  7.5  5.9  10.0
Expanded Coverage
(4)  Total (incl.  D.C)  17.4  16.8  18.2
(5)  Transition cost  1.6  2.8  0
(6)  Basic Benefit  7.3  5.5  9.7
*See Table 6 for definition of uniform contribution rate for basic benefit
+  transition.  Defined contribution (DC)  rate = 8.5%.
43Table  8. Annual  Surplus  and  Total  fund  in Transition  Account  and  Pillar  Ia
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2050  2100
Without  coverage  expansion
Revenues  minus  Pension  Payments
in transition  account
as  t  of covered  wage  bill  (12)  (8)  (8)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Funds  in transition  acct+Pillar  I  (6)  (30)  (36)  (38)  (43)  (33)  0
as  % of current  covered  wage  bill
as % of  1995  covered  wage  bill  (6)  (41)  (96)  (145)  (221)  (318)  0
With  coverage  expansion
Revenues  minus  Pension  Payments
in transition  account  (13)  (6)  (2)  (1)  0  1
as  t  of covered  wage  bill
Debt  of transition  acct+  Pillar  I  (8)  (19)  (7)  6  13  22  0
as % of current  covered  wage  bill
as % of 1995  covered  wage  bill  (8)  (37)  (35)  59  194  634  0
a  numbers  in parentheses  are  deficits  or debt.
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45Figure 2. Trade-Off Between Retirement Age and Replacement Rate
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